added the elmeent on the nav and fixed the payments transactions

app/ClientLayout.js

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ export default function ClientLayout({ children }) {
         name: authUser.name || authUser.email,
         email: authUser.email,
         phone: authUser.phone,
-        role: AuthService.isOwner() ? UserRole.OWNER : UserRole.CUSTOMER,
+        role: AuthService.isOwner() ? UserRole.OWNER : AuthService.isAgent() ? UserRole.AGENT : UserRole.CUSTOMER,
       });
     } else {
       setUser(null);
@@ -135,6 +135,8 @@ export default function ClientLayout({ children }) {
   const isProfilePage = pathname === "/profile";
 
   const isOwner = user?.role === UserRole.OWNER;
+  const isAgent = user?.role === UserRole.AGENT;
+  const isOwnerOrAgent = isOwner || isAgent;
   const isCustomer = user?.role === UserRole.CUSTOMER;
   const isAuthenticated = !!user;
 
@@ -718,7 +720,7 @@ export default function ClientLayout({ children }) {
           </main>
 
           {isAuthenticated && !isAuthPage && (
-            <BottomNav isOwner={isOwner} />
+            <BottomNav isOwner={isOwner} isOwnerOrAgent={isOwnerOrAgent} />
           )}
         </FavoritesProvider>
       </NotificationsProvider>

app/components/BottomNav.js

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 "use client";
 
 import Link from "next/link";
-import { Home, Building, Calendar, Heart, Bell, Settings, CreditCard } from "lucide-react";
+import { Home, Building, Calendar, Heart, Bell, Settings, CreditCard, Briefcase } from "lucide-react";
 import React, { useEffect, useState } from "react";
 import { useNotifications } from "@/app/contexts/NotificationsContext";
 
-export default function BottomNav({ isOwner }) {
+export default function BottomNav({ isOwner, isOwnerOrAgent }) {
   const { unreadCount } = useNotifications();
   const [isMounted, setIsMounted] = useState(false);
   const bookingsHref = isOwner ? "/owner/reservations" : "/reservations";
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ export default function BottomNav({ isOwner }) {
   const items = [
     { href: "/", label: "الرئيسية", icon: Home },
     { href: "/properties", label: "عقاراتنا", icon: Building },
+    ...(isOwnerOrAgent ? [{ href: "/owner/properties", label: "عقاراتي", icon: Briefcase }] : []),
     { href: bookingsHref, label: "الحجوزات", icon: Calendar },
     { href: "/favorites", label: "المفضلة", icon: Heart },
     { href: "/payments", label: "المدفوعات", icon: CreditCard },

app/enums/UserRole.js

@@ -7,18 +7,21 @@ const UserRole = Object.freeze({
   GUEST: 'guest',
   CUSTOMER: 'customer',
   OWNER: 'owner',
+  AGENT: 'agent',
 });
 
 const UserRoleLabels = Object.freeze({
   [UserRole.GUEST]: 'زائر',
   [UserRole.CUSTOMER]: 'مستأجر',
   [UserRole.OWNER]: 'مالك عقار',
+  [UserRole.AGENT]: 'وسيط عقاري',
 });
 
 const UserRoleColors = Object.freeze({
   [UserRole.GUEST]: 'gray',
   [UserRole.CUSTOMER]: 'blue',
   [UserRole.OWNER]: 'amber',
+  [UserRole.AGENT]: 'purple',
 });
 
 export { UserRole, UserRoleLabels, UserRoleColors };

app/payments/page.js

@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ import { motion } from 'framer-motion';
 import { CreditCard, Loader2, Home, Calendar, Check, X, Clock, LogIn, Lock } from 'lucide-react';
 import toast, { Toaster } from 'react-hot-toast';
 import AuthService from '@/app/services/AuthService';
-import { payDeposit } from '@/app/utils/api';
+import { payDeposit, getMyTransaction } from '@/app/utils/api';
 
 const STATUS_MAP = ['pending', 'ownerConfirmed', 'depositPaid', 'depositConfirmed', 'completed', 'cancelled'];
 
@@ -179,35 +179,10 @@ export default function PaymentsPage() {
   const [payingId, setPayingId] = useState(null);
   const [isGuest, setIsGuest] = useState(null);
 
-  const getAuthToken = () => {
-    if (typeof window === 'undefined') return '';
-    return (
-      AuthService?.getToken?.() ||
-      AuthService?.getAccessToken?.() ||
-      localStorage.getItem('token') ||
-      localStorage.getItem('accessToken') ||
-      localStorage.getItem('authToken') ||
-      ''
-    );
-  };
-
   const loadReservations = useCallback(async () => {
     try {
-      const token = getAuthToken();
+      const data = await getMyTransaction();
-
+      const items = Array.isArray(data) ? data : [];
-      const res = await fetch('http://45.93.137.91/api/Customer/GetMyTransaction', {
-        method: 'GET',
-        headers: {
-          ...(token ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` } : {}),
-        },
-      });
-
-      if (!res.ok) {
-        throw new Error('فشل تحميل المدفوعات');
-      }
-
-      const json = await res.json();
-      const items = Array.isArray(json?.data) ? json.data : Array.isArray(json) ? json : [];
 
       const mapped = items.map((item) => {
         const deposit = item?.diposit || item?.deposit || {};

app/services/AuthService.js

@@ -126,12 +126,20 @@ const AuthService = Object.freeze({
     return this.getRoles().includes('Owner');
   },
 
+  /**
+   * User has RealEstateAgent role
+   * @returns {boolean}
+   */
+  isAgent() {
+    return this.getRoles().includes('RealEstateAgent');
+  },
+
   /**
    * Authenticated user without Owner role (i.e. customer)
    * @returns {boolean}
    */
   isCustomer() {
-    return this.isAuthenticated() && !this.isOwner();
+    return this.isAuthenticated() && !this.isOwner() && !this.isAgent();
   },
 
   /**

app/utils/api.js

@@ -1032,6 +1032,12 @@ export async function payDeposit(data) {
   });
 }
 
+export async function getMyTransaction() {
+  return apiFetch("/Customer/GetMyTransaction", {
+    method: "GET",
+  });
+}
+
 // ─── Owner Contact & Stats ───
 
 export async function getOwnerContactInformation(propertyInformationId) {

full-project-analysis.md

@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+# SweetHome — Full Project Analysis
+
+**Project:** SweetHome Next.js Real Estate Application
+**Date:** June 16, 2026
+**Framework:** Next.js 16.1.6 (App Router) + React 18.3.1
+**Language:** JavaScript (no TypeScript)
+**Styling:** Tailwind CSS v4 + DaisyUI (unused) + Flowbite (unused)
+**API:** Custom `.NET` backend at `https://45.93.137.91.nip.io/api`
+
+---
+
+## 1. Project Structure
+
+### Directory Tree (Top 3 Levels)
+
+```
+SweetHome/
+├── .gitea/workflows/            # CI/CD deployer
+├── app/                         # ★ MAIN APP (112 source files)
+│   ├── account-verification/    # OTP email/phone verification
+│   ├── auth/choose-role/        # Owner/Tenant/Agent role picker
+│   ├── blocked/                 # Blocked account page
+│   ├── booked-properties/       # User's booked properties
+│   ├── change-password/         # Change password form
+│   ├── components/              # ★ 14 reusable components
+│   │   ├── home/                # HeroSearch, PropertyMap
+│   │   ├── property/            # BookingCalendar, PropertyMap
+│   │   ├── ratings/             # StarRating, PropertyRatingForm, etc.
+│   │   ├── BottomNav.js         # Mobile bottom nav
+│   │   ├── FloatingSidebar.js   # Desktop floating sidebar
+│   │   ├── NavLinks.js          # Nav link atoms
+│   │   ├── NotificationHandler.js # Firebase FCM handler
+│   │   └── PropertyMapWithMarkers.js # Standalone Leaflet map
+│   ├── contexts/                # ★ 3 context providers
+│   │   ├── FavoritesContext.js
+│   │   ├── NotificationsContext.js
+│   │   └── PropertyContext.js   # ORPHANED (never mounted)
+│   ├── enums/                   # 20 enum constant files
+│   ├── faq/                     # FAQ accordion page
+│   ├── favorites/               # Favorites list page
+│   ├── forgot-password/         # 3-step forgot password
+│   ├── i18n/                    # i18next config (Arabic/English)
+│   ├── login/                   # 2-step login (credential + OTP)
+│   ├── my-rates/                # Ratings received from owners
+│   ├── notifications/           # Notifications list page
+│   ├── onboarding/              # 3-step intro wizard
+│   ├── owner/                   # ★ Owner dashboard (6 sub-routes)
+│   │   ├── account-book/        # Financial dashboard
+│   │   ├── bookings/            # Booking management
+│   │   ├── calendar/            # Monthly calendar view
+│   │   ├── profits/             # Revenue/profit stats
+│   │   ├── properties/          # CRUD property management
+│   │   └── reservations/        # Reservation requests
+│   ├── payments/                # Deposit payment page
+│   ├── privacy/                 # Privacy policy
+│   ├── profile/                 # User profile CRUD
+│   ├── properties/              # Property listings grid
+│   ├── property/[id]/           # Property detail (dynamic route)
+│   ├── register/                # Registration (tenant/owner/agent)
+│   ├── reports/                 # 3-tab report submission
+│   ├── reservations/            # Customer reservations
+│   ├── services/                # AuthService.js
+│   ├── settings/                # Account settings
+│   ├── support/                 # Support contact form
+│   ├── terms/                   # Terms of service
+│   ├── utils/                   # ★ api.js, calculations, firebase, etc.
+│   ├── ClientLayout.js          # Client layout shell (804 lines)
+│   ├── layout.js                # Root server layout
+│   ├── globals.css              # Tailwind + custom fonts
+│   ├── page.js                  # Home page
+│   ├── error.js                 # Error boundary
+│   ├── loading.js               # Loading state
+│   └── not-found.js             # 404 page
+├── public/                      # Static files (fonts, images, APK)
+│   ├── files/SweetHome.apk      # Android APK
+│   ├── fonts/                   # Madani Arabic (woff2 + ttf)
+│   └── firebase-messaging-sw.js # FCM service worker
+├── package.json                 # 18 prod + 7 dev dependencies
+├── next.config.mjs              # Next.js config
+├── postcss.config.mjs           # PostCSS + Tailwind
+├── jsconfig.json                # Path aliases (@/* → ./)
+└── security-audit-report.md     # Previous security audit
+```
+
+### Route Summary (33 pages)
+
+| Type | Routes | Count |
+|------|--------|-------|
+| Public | `/`, `/login`, `/register/*`, `/forgot-password`, `/auth/choose-role`, `/properties`, `/property/[id]`, `/terms`, `/privacy`, `/faq`, `/support`, `/onboarding` | 14 |
+| Protected (auth only) | `/profile`, `/settings`, `/change-password`, `/account-verification`, `/favorites`, `/booked-properties`, `/reservations`, `/notifications`, `/payments`, `/my-rates`, `/reports`, `/blocked` | 12 |
+| Owner only | `/owner/properties`, `/owner/properties/add`, `/owner/reservations`, `/owner/bookings`, `/owner/calendar`, `/owner/profits`, `/owner/account-book` | 7 |
+
+---
+
+## 2. Architecture Overview
+
+### Layout Hierarchy
+
+```
+app/layout.js (Server Component — root HTML, fonts, metadata)
+  └── app/ClientLayout.js (Client Component — 804 lines)
+        ├── <NotificationsProvider>     (context)
+        │   └── <FavoritesProvider>     (context)
+        │       └── <main>{children}</main>
+        ├── <BottomNav />               (mobile, authenticated only)
+        └── <NotificationHandler />     (FCM push notifications)
+```
+
+- **No nested layouts** — flat route structure
+- **No `middleware.js`** — all route protection is client-side only
+- Nav bar hidden on auth pages (`/login`, `/register/*`, `/blocked`, `/forgot-password`, `/auth/choose-role`)
+
+### Data Flow Pattern
+
+```
+Page (useEffect on mount)
+  → API call (apiFetch from app/utils/api.js)
+    → AuthService.getToken() → Authorization: Bearer <JWT>
+    → fetch() to https://45.93.137.91.nip.io/api/{endpoint}
+    → Response: auto-unwrap { data: ... } envelope
+    → Return parsed data or throw on non-ok
+  → Component state (useState)
+  → Render UI with Tailwind classes
+```
+
+---
+
+## 3. API Layer
+
+**File:** `app/utils/api.js` (1198 lines — 370 commented legacy + 828 active)
+**Ratings API:** `app/utils/ratings.js` (separate file with own `apiFetch`)
+
+### Fetch Helpers
+
+| Function | Lines | Method | Auth | Error Handling | Return Type |
+|----------|-------|--------|------|----------------|-------------|
+| `apiFetch(endpoint, options)` | 421-478 | Any | Auto Bearer | Throws on non-ok (except 206) | `data` (auto-unwrapped) |
+| `authFetch(endpoint, body, token)` | 483-524 | POST | Manual param | Returns `{status,data,ok,message}` | Object |
+| `reportFetch(endpoint, body)` | 526-558 | POST | None | Returns `{status,data,ok,message}` | Object |
+| `multipartAuthFetch(endpoint, formData)` | 772-803 | POST | Auto Bearer | Returns `{status,data,ok,message}` | Object |
+
+### Exported API Functions (47 total)
+
+| Category | Functions | Count |
+|----------|-----------|-------|
+| Rent Properties | `getRentProperties`, `getRentProperty`, `getRentPropertyLocations`, `filterRentProperties` | 4 |
+| Sale Properties | `getSaleProperties`, `getSaleProperty`, `getSalePropertyById` | 3 |
+| Generic Property | `getProperty` | 1 |
+| Recommendations | `getRecommendations`, `getTopRecommendations` | 2 |
+| Reservations | `getAvailableDateRanges`, `getReservations`, `getReservation`, `checkAvailability`, `bookReservation`, `getUserReservations`, `getOwnerReservationRequests`, `getOwnerReservationsByStatuses`, `ownerConfirmReservation`, `confirmDepositPayment`, `adminConfirmDeposit`, `updateBookingStatus`, `payDeposit` | 13 |
+| Owner Management | `getMyRentListings`, `getMySaleListings`, `addRentProperty`, `addSaleProperty`, `editRentProperty`, `editSaleProperty`, `updateRentPropertyStatus`, `updateSalePropertyStatus`, `getOwnerContactInformation`, `getOwnerStatistics` | 10 |
+| Auth | `loginWithEmail`, `loginWithPhone`, `sendEmailOTP`, `sendPhoneOTP`, `verifyEmail`, `verifyPhone`, `changePassword`, `requestForgetPasswordOtp`, `verifyForgetPasswordOtp`, `resetPassword`, `deleteMyAccount` | 11 |
+| Registration | `addOwner`, `addCustomer`, `registerRealEstateAgent` | 3 |
+| Favorites | `getUserFavoriteProperties`, `addFavoriteProperty`, `removeFavoriteProperty` | 3 |
+| Notifications | `getUserNotifications`, `setFCMToken` | 2 |
+| Terms | `getARTerms`, `getENTerms`, `addOrUpdateTerms` | 3 |
+| Currencies | `getCurrencies` | 1 |
+| Files | `uploadPicture` | 1 |
+| Reports | `sendGeneralReport`, `submitReport`, `submitReservationReport`, `updateReservationReport`, `submitSaleReport`, `updateSaleReport` | 6 |
+| Profile | `getCustomerByUserId`, `getOwnerByUserId` | 2 |
+
+### Ratings API (5 functions)
+
+`addPropertyRating`, `addCustomerRating`, `getPropertyRatings`, `getCustomerRatings`, `getPropertyAverageRating`
+
+### API Endpoint Coverage
+
+| HTTP Method | Count | Examples |
+|-------------|-------|----------|
+| GET | 26 | `/RentProperties/GetRentProperties`, `/Reservations/GetAvailableDates/available/${id}` |
+| POST | 17 | `/Auth/LogInWithEmail`, `/Reservations/PayDeposit/pay-deposit`, `/Rating/AddPropertyRating` |
+| PUT | 8 | `/RentProperties/EditRentProperty/${id}`, `/Reservations/AdminConfirmDeposit/admin-confirm-deposit` |
+| DELETE | 2 | `/FavoriteProperty/Remove`, `/User/DeleteMyAccount` |
+
+---
+
+## 4. State Management
+
+### Context Providers
+
+| Context | File | State | Consumers | Status |
+|---------|------|-------|-----------|--------|
+| **FavoritesProvider** | `app/contexts/FavoritesContext.js` | `favorites[]`, `isLoading` | `FloatingSidebar`, `/favorites`, `/properties`, `/property/[id]` | ✅ Active |
+| **NotificationsProvider** | `app/contexts/NotificationsContext.js` | `notifications[]`, `unreadCount`, `isLoading` | `BottomNav`, `FloatingSidebar` | ✅ Active |
+| **PropertyContext** | `app/contexts/PropertyContext.js` | `properties[]`, `loading`, `error` | None | ❌ Orphaned (never mounted) |
+| **PropertyContext** | `app/utils/PropertyContext.js` | Same as above | None | ❌ Orphaned duplicate |
+
+### localStorage Keys (10 actively written, ~5 legacy read-only)
+
+| Key | Data | Written By | Read By |
+|-----|------|------------|---------|
+| `auth_token` | JWT string | `AuthService.addToken()` | `AuthService.getToken()`, `firebase.js` |
+| `cached_user` | User profile JSON | `AuthService.cacheUser()` | `AuthService.getCachedUser()` |
+| `language` | "en" or "ar" | `ClientLayout.js` | `ClientLayout.js` |
+| `sweethome_onboarding_completed` | "true" | `/onboarding/page.js` | `/onboarding/page.js` |
+| `ownerProperties` | Properties array JSON | `/owner/properties/page.js` | `/owner/calendar/page.js` |
+| `ownerBookings` | Bookings array JSON | `/owner/bookings/page.js` | `/owner/bookings/page.js` |
+| `ownerProfitsTable` | Profit data JSON | `/owner/profits/page.js` | `/owner/profits/page.js` |
+| `userProfile` | Profile form data JSON | `/profile/page.js` | `/profile/page.js` |
+| `userAvatar` | Base64 data URL | `/profile/page.js` | `/profile/page.js` |
+| `token`, `accessToken`, `authToken` | (legacy reads only) | — | `/settings`, `/payments`, `/reservations` |
+
+### Auth Flow
+
+```
+Login (app/login/page.js)
+  → loginWithEmail() / loginWithPhone()
+  → authFetch(POST /Auth/LogInWithEmail, { credential, password, device: 0 })
+  → 200: AuthService.addToken(token) → localStorage.setItem('auth_token', token)
+  → 206: OTP required → sendEmailOTP() → verifyEmail(code) → get final token
+  → AuthService.cacheUser(user) → localStorage.setItem('cached_user', ...)
+  → router.push('/')
+
+ClientLayout.js (every page navigation)
+  → AuthService.getUser() → decode JWT payload (base64 atob)
+  → setUser({ name, email, phone, role: isOwner() ? 'owner' : 'customer' })
+  → UI branches on user.role (show owner nav / customer nav / guest nav)
+
+Page-level checks
+  → Each protected page independently calls:
+    AuthService.isAuthenticated() → else router.push('/login')
+    AuthService.isOwner() → else router.push('/')
+```
+
+---
+
+## 5. Component Architecture
+
+### Component Inventory (14 reusable components)
+
+| Component | File | Lines | Purpose | State |
+|-----------|------|-------|---------|-------|
+| HeroSearch | `components/home/HeroSearch.js` | 321 | Hero search with filters | `filters`, login dialog |
+| PropertyMap (home) | `components/home/PropertyMap.js` | 287 | Map with markers + popup | `selectedProperty`, map ref |
+| PropertyMap (property) | `components/property/PropertyMap.js` | 166 | Map at property detail | Tooltip state |
+| BookingCalendar | `components/property/BookingCalendar.js` | 124 | Monthly booking grid | `currentMonth`, `selectedStart` |
+| PropertyMapWithMarkers | `components/PropertyMapWithMarkers.js` | 100 | Generic Leaflet map | Map ref, markers ref |
+| StarRating | `components/ratings/StarRating.js` | 134 | 5-star input | `hoverRating` |
+| PropertyRatingList | `components/ratings/PropertyRatingList.js` | 286 | Paginated reviews | `ratings`, `page`, `loading` |
+| PropertyRatingForm | `components/ratings/PropertyRatingForm.js` | 317 | 4-field rating form | Clean/services/owner/experience |
+| CustomerRatingForm | `components/ratings/CustomerRatingForm.js` | 92 | 3-field rating form | Furn/terms/behavior |
+| BottomNav | `components/BottomNav.js` | 58 | Mobile bottom bar | Badge from context |
+| FloatingSidebar | `components/FloatingSidebar.js` | 158 | Quick-access buttons | Framer-motion variants |
+| NavLinks | `components/NavLinks.js` | 42 | Nav link atoms | `usePathname` active |
+| NotificationHandler | `components/NotificationHandler.js` | 151 | FCM push handler | Permission state |
+
+### Largest Page Files
+
+| Rank | File | Lines | Complexity |
+|------|------|-------|------------|
+| 1 | `api.js` | 1198 | 60+ functions, 4 fetch helpers, 370 lines commented |
+| 2 | `PropertyDetail.js` | 1743 | 56 imports, 8+ state vars, booking calendar, image gallery, owner check, ratings, map |
+| 3 | `owner/properties/page.js` | 2057 | CRUD + modals + localStorage caching + API calls |
+| 4 | `ClientLayout.js` | 804 | Nav (desktop+mobile), user menu, language switcher, context providers |
+| 5 | `owner/properties/add/page.js` | 700+ | Multi-step form with map, image upload, pricing |
+| 6 | `app/page.js` (Home) | 623 | Property fetching, multi-filter, hero, map, feature cards |
+
+---
+
+## 6. Key Patterns
+
+### Data Fetching (4 Patterns)
+
+| Pattern | Usage | Found In |
+|---------|-------|----------|
+| `useEffect` + `useState` | ~90% of pages | Most pages |
+| Context-level fetch | 2 providers | `FavoritesContext`, `NotificationsContext` |
+| localStorage cache | Owner dashboards | `owner/bookings`, `owner/calendar`, `owner/profits` |
+| Mock data fallback | 3 owner pages | `owner/bookings`, `owner/calendar`, `owner/profits` |
+
+### Styling
+
+- 100% Tailwind CSS v4 (utility classes, no CSS modules)
+- Custom `globals.css`: Madani Arabic fonts (9 weights), Leaflet overrides, keyframe animations
+- Color palette: `amber-500/600` (primary), `#ede6e6` (bg), `#156874` (accent teal)
+- RTL-first with dynamic LTR switching via `currentLanguage` state
+
+### Animations (Framer Motion v12.29.2)
+
+- `initial/animate` opacity + y/x translations (section reveals)
+- `whileHover`/`whileTap` scale (buttons, interactive elements)
+- `AnimatePresence` (property popups, user menus)
+- `whileInView` + `viewport` (scroll-triggered animations on home page)
+- `staggerChildren` (hero text)
+- Spring transitions `{ type: "spring", damping: 25, stiffness: 300 }`
+
+### Form Handling
+
+- **All forms**: Controlled `useState` — no React Hook Form, Formik, or `useReducer`
+- **Validation**: Inline `value === 0 && <p className="text-red-500">مطلوب</p>`
+- **No form libraries** — all hand-rolled
+
+### Responsive Breakpoints
+
+| Breakpoint | Layout |
+|------------|--------|
+| Default (mobile) | Single column, BottomNav, hamburger menu |
+| `md:` (768px) | Desktop nav, 2-3 column grids |
+| `lg:` (1024px) | PropertyDetail sidebar, 3-column grids |
+
+---
+
+## 7. Owner Pages Analysis (Dashboard Section)
+
+| Route | File | Lines | Status | Data Source |
+|-------|------|-------|--------|-------------|
+| `/owner/properties` | `owner/properties/page.js` | 2057 | ✅ Active | API (`getMyRentListings`, `getMySaleListings`) + localStorage cache |
+| `/owner/properties/add` | `owner/properties/add/page.js` | 700+ | ✅ Active | API (`addRentProperty`, `addSaleProperty`, `uploadPicture`) |
+| `/owner/reservations` | `owner/reservations/page.js` | 1400+ | ❌ Commented out | Mock data (commented) |
+| `/owner/bookings` | `owner/bookings/page.js` | 560+ | ⚠️ Demo | localStorage mock data only |
+| `/owner/calendar` | `owner/calendar/page.js` | 580+ | ⚠️ Demo | localStorage mock data only |
+| `/owner/profits` | `owner/profits/page.js` | 600+ | ⚠️ Demo | localStorage mock data only |
+| `/owner/account-book` | `owner/account-book/page.js` | 500+ | ✅ Active | API (`getOwnerStatistics`) |
+
+---
+
+## 8. Admin Functionality
+
+| Component | Status | Data Source |
+|-----------|--------|-------------|
+| BookingRequests | ✅ Active | Real API (`getReservations`, `adminConfirmDeposit`) |
+| Users | ❌ Not implemented | — |
+| Properties | ❌ Not implemented | — |
+| LedgerBook | ⚠️ Mock only | 3 hardcoded mock transactions |
+| Dashboard | ❌ Not implemented | — |
+
+Designed for internal admin use at `/admin` — tabs for Bookings/Users/Properties/Ledger/Dashboard.
+
+---
+
+## 9. Known Technical Debt
+
+### Dead Code
+
+| File | Dead Lines | Issue |
+|------|-----------|-------|
+| `api.js` | Lines 1-370 (370 lines) | Entire legacy version commented out |
+| `StarRating.js` | Lines 1-93 (93 lines) | Old framer-motion version commented out |
+| `PropertyRatingList.js` | ~150 lines | Old version commented out |
+| `PropertyRatingForm.js` | ~220 lines | Old version commented out |
+| `contexts/PropertyContext.js` | Entire file | Never mounted |
+| `utils/PropertyContext.js` | Entire file | Duplicate orphan |
+
+### Code Duplication
+
+| Pattern | Files | Description |
+|---------|-------|-------------|
+| Leaflet maps | 3 separate files | `PropertyMapWithMarkers.js`, `home/PropertyMap.js`, `property/PropertyMap.js` — all setup Leaflet identically |
+| Rating forms | `PropertyRatingForm.js` (317) + `CustomerRatingForm.js` (92) | ~75% code overlap; both define identical `RatingField` inline |
+| formatCurrency | 4+ locations | Scattered across files with slightly different logic |
+| Image URL building | 4+ locations | Different implementations for same task |
+| Notifications page | `/notifications/page.js` vs `NotificationsContext` | Page duplicates all context state/logic |
+
+### Architecture Issues
+
+| Issue | Impact |
+|-------|--------|
+| No middleware.js | All route protection is client-side only |
+| JWT in localStorage | XSS-vulnerable token storage |
+| Client-side role checks | Users can modify JWT to elevate privileges |
+| Owner pages use mock data | `/owner/bookings`, `/owner/calendar`, `/owner/profits` are demo-only |
+| 3 unused UI libraries | DaisyUI, Flowbite, Yandex Maps imported but never used |
+| No TypeScript | 112 JS files, no type safety |
+| No ESLint | No linting configured |
+| No testing framework | Zero tests |
+| Flat route structure | No nested layouts; all pages share root layout |
+| Active console.log | ~30+ files with console.log statements (security risk) |
+
+---
+
+## 10. Dependencies
+
+### Production (18)
+
+| Package | Version | Purpose |
+|---------|---------|---------|
+| next | 16.1.6 | Framework |
+| react / react-dom | ^18.3.1 | UI |
+| firebase | ^12.11.0 | FCM push notifications |
+| leaflet / react-leaflet | 1.9.4 / 4.2.1 | Maps |
+| @pbe/react-yandex-maps | ^1.2.5 | Yandex Maps (unused) |
+| framer-motion | ^12.29.2 | Animations |
+| lucide-react | ^0.563.0 | Icons |
+| flowbite / flowbite-react | 4.0.1 / 0.12.16 | UI library (unused) |
+| react-hot-toast | ^2.6.0 | Toasts |
+| i18next / react-i18next / i18next-browser-languagedetector | 25.8 / 16.5 / 8.2 | i18n |
+| jspdf / html2canvas | 4.2.1 / 1.4.1 | PDF generation |
+| xlsx | ^0.18.5 | Excel export |
+| react-intersection-observer | ^10.0.3 | Scroll detection |
+
+### Dev (7)
+
+| Package | Version | Purpose |
+|---------|---------|---------|
+| tailwindcss | ^4.1.18 | CSS framework |
+| @tailwindcss/postcss | ^4 | PostCSS plugin |
+| postcss / autoprefixer | ^8.5.6 / ^10.4.23 | CSS processing |
+| daisyui | ^5.5.14 | UI components (unused) |
+| babel-plugin-react-compiler | 1.0.0 | React compiler optimization |
+
+### Missing (notable absences)
+- No TypeScript
+- No ESLint
+- No testing (Jest, Playwright, Cypress)
+- No state management library (Redux, Zustand)
+- No data fetching library (React Query, SWR)
+- No form library (React Hook Form, Formik)
+- No security lib (helmet, cors, csurf)
+- No HTTP client (axios, ky)
+- No JWT lib (jsonwebtoken, jose)
+
+---
+
+## 11. Security Summary
+
+*(See `security-audit-report.md` for full details)*
+
+| # | Finding | Severity |
+|---|---------|----------|
+| 1 | JWT in localStorage (XSS-theft) | 🔴 Critical |
+| 2 | Stored XSS via Leaflet popup HTML | 🔴 Critical |
+| 3 | OTP code logged to console | 🔴 Critical |
+| 4 | No server-side middleware | 🔴 Critical |
+| 5 | Passwords in URL query params | 🔴 Critical |
+| 6 | IDOR on property edit/status APIs | 🔴 Critical |
+| 7 | Client-only role checks | 🟠 High |
+| 8 | HTTP endpoints leak tokens | 🟠 High |
+| 9 | No CSP/security headers | 🟠 High |
+| 10 | Mass assignment via spread | 🟠 High |
+| 11 | Error messages leak internals | 🟠 High |
+| 12 | Hardcoded IPs (10+ files) | 🟡 Medium |
+
+---
+
+## 12. File Size Heatmap
+
+| Size Range | Files | Examples |
+|------------|-------|----------|
+| 1500-2100 lines | 2 | `PropertyDetail.js` (1743), `owner/properties/page.js` (2057) |
+| 600-1200 lines | 6 | `api.js` (1198), `ClientLayout.js` (804), `login/page.js` (800+), `owner/properties/add/page.js` (700+), `app/page.js` (623), `owner/bookings/page.js` (560+) |
+| 200-600 lines | 15 | Most page files |
+| < 200 lines | ~70 | Enum files, smaller components, error/loading pages |

security-audit-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,488 @@
+# SweetHome — Full Security Audit & Pentest Report
+
+**Project:** SweetHome Next.js Real Estate Application
+**Date:** June 16, 2026
+**Scope:** Client-side source code analysis (full white-box)
+
+---
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+| Severity | Count | Key Issues |
+|----------|-------|------------|
+| 🔴 **CRITICAL** | 8 | JWT in localStorage, XSS via Leaflet, OTP in console, no middleware, passwords in URL params, IDOR on edit APIs |
+| 🟠 **HIGH** | 12 | Client-only role checks, HTTP endpoints, credential logging, mass assignment, error leakage, no CSP |
+| 🟡 **MEDIUM** | 15 | Hardcoded IPs, stale localStorage keys, weak validation, no security headers, FCM token exposure |
+| 🟢 **LOW** | 6 | Missing maxLength, base64 avatar in storage, weak email regex |
+
+---
+
+## 🔴 CRITICAL FINDINGS
+
+### C1. JWT Stored in `localStorage` (No httpOnly Cookie)
+
+**Files:** `app/services/AuthService.js:23-38`, `app/settings/page.js:335-339`, `app/payments/page.js:185-189`
+
+```javascript
+const TOKEN_KEY = 'auth_token';
+const USER_KEY = 'cached_user';
+
+const AuthService = Object.freeze({
+  addToken(token) {
+    localStorage.setItem(TOKEN_KEY, token);     // <-- XSS-accessible
+  },
+  getToken() {
+    return localStorage.getItem(TOKEN_KEY);      // <-- XSS-accessible
+  },
+  deleteToken() {
+    localStorage.removeItem(TOKEN_KEY);
+    localStorage.removeItem(USER_KEY);
+  },
+```
+
+**Impact:** Any XSS vulnerability gives attackers permanent token theft. No httpOnly, Secure, or SameSite protection. Token persists across tabs with no client-side expiration enforcement.
+
+**Multiple fallback keys** (fragmented storage):
+- `auth_token` (primary)
+- `token`, `accessToken`, `authToken` (fallbacks in settings, payments, reservations pages)
+- `cached_user` (user profile data)
+- `userProfile`, `userAvatar` (profile page - base64 images!)
+
+---
+
+### C2. Stored XSS via Leaflet Popup HTML Construction
+
+**File:** `app/components/PropertyMapWithMarkers.js:51-65`
+
+```javascript
+const popupContent = `
+  <div dir="rtl" style="text-align: right; padding: 12px; max-width: 250px;">
+    <h3 style="font-weight: bold; font-size: 16px; margin-bottom: 8px; color: #111;">
+      ${property.title || 'عقار'}
+    </h3>
+    <p style="font-size: 14px; color: #666; margin-bottom: 8px;">
+      ${property.address || property.location?.address || ''}
+    </p>
+    ${property.images && property.images.length > 0
+      ? `<img src="${property.images[0]}" alt="${property.title}"
+           style="width:100%;height:120px;object-fit:cover;border-radius:8px;"
+           onerror="this.src='/property-placeholder.jpg'" />`
+      : ''
+    }
+  </div>
+`;
+marker.bindPopup(popupContent);
+```
+
+**Impact:** Property data (title, address, image URLs) from API is interpolated directly into HTML without sanitization. A malicious owner or compromised API can execute arbitrary JavaScript in every viewer's session. `onerror` handler on `<img>` provides an additional execution vector.
+
+**Also affected:** `app/components/home/PropertyMap.js:227` — `property.priceUSD` interpolated into `L.divIcon({ html: ... })`.
+
+---
+
+### C3. OTP Verification Code Logged to Browser Console
+
+**File:** `app/login/page.js:200-203`
+
+```javascript
+console.log("[OTP] Verifying code:", otpCode);       // <-- OTP in plaintext
+console.log("[OTP] Verify response status:", result.status);
+```
+
+**Impact:** OTP codes are one-time passwords. Browser extensions, devtools monitors, or error-logging services can capture them. Full account takeover via credential + OTP.
+
+---
+
+### C4. No Server-Side Route Middleware
+
+**No `middleware.js` file exists** in the project. Every protected route relies on **client-side only** checks:
+
+```javascript
+// app/ClientLayout.js:74-86 — Role read from JWT, no server verification
+useEffect(() => {
+  const authUser = AuthService.getUser();
+  if (authUser) {
+    setUser({ role: AuthService.isOwner() ? UserRole.OWNER : UserRole.CUSTOMER });
+  }
+}, [pathname]);
+```
+
+**Impact:** Routes like `/owner/*`, `/settings`, `/profile`, `/payments`, `/reservations` have zero server-side protection. If JS fails to load, pages render unauthenticated.
+
+---
+
+### C5. Passwords Sent as URL Query Parameters
+
+**File:** `app/utils/api.js:1082-1088`
+
+```javascript
+export async function changePassword(oldPassword, newPassword) {
+  return apiFetch(
+    `/User/ChangePassword?oldPassword=${encodeURIComponent(oldPassword)}&newPassword=${encodeURIComponent(newPassword)}`,
+    { method: "PUT" },
+  );
+}
+
+export async function deleteMyAccount(password) {
+  return apiFetch(
+    `/User/DeleteMyAccount?password=${encodeURIComponent(password)}`,
+    { method: "DELETE" },
+  );
+}
+```
+
+**Impact:** Passwords in URL query parameters are logged by web servers, proxies, browser history, and the `apiFetch` `console.log("API Body:", ...)` at `api.js:445`. Also leaked via `Referer` header.
+
+---
+
+### C6. IDOR — No Ownership Verification on Property Edit/Status APIs
+
+**File:** `app/utils/api.js:691-732`
+
+```javascript
+editRentProperty(id, data)           // PUT /RentProperties/EditRentProperty/${id}
+editSaleProperty(id, data)           // PUT /SaleProperties/EditSaleProperty/${id}
+updateRentPropertyStatus(id, status) // PUT /RentProperties/UpdateStatus/${id}
+updateSalePropertyStatus(id, status) // PUT /SaleProperties/UpdateStatus/${id}
+```
+
+**Impact:** Any authenticated user can edit or deactivate **any** property by guessing/iterating IDs. The `GetMyRentListings` fetch filters to "my" properties, but the edit API has no server-side ownership check.
+
+---
+
+### C7. IDOR — Reservation Confirmation Without Ownership Check
+
+**File:** `app/owner/reservations/page.js:1309-1332`
+
+```javascript
+const handleConfirm = async (r) => {
+    setActionLoadingId(r.id);
+    const res = await API(
+      AuthService.getToken(),
+      'PUT',
+      `/Reservations/OwnerConfirmReservation/owner-confirm/${r.id}`
+    );
+```
+
+**Impact:** Any owner can confirm/reject **any** reservation by ID, regardless of whether they own the property. Combined with C6, an attacker could spam-confirm reservations across the platform.
+
+---
+
+### C8. IDOR — Profile APIs Expose Any User's Data
+
+**File:** `app/utils/api.js:670-676`
+
+```javascript
+getCustomerByUserId(userId)  // GET /Customer/GetByUserId/${userId}
+getOwnerByUserId(userId)     // GET /Owner/GetByUserId/${userId}
+```
+
+**Impact:** If the backend doesn't verify the requesting user matches the target `userId`, this allows enumerating all user profiles (name, email, phone, WhatsApp, national number).
+
+---
+
+## 🟠 HIGH FINDINGS
+
+### H1. Client-Side Only Role Checks (JWT Decoded Without Signature Verification)
+
+**File:** `app/services/AuthService.js:66-75`
+
+```javascript
+decodeToken() {
+  const token = this.getToken();
+  if (!token) return null;
+  try {
+    const payload = token.split('.')[1];
+    return JSON.parse(atob(payload));   // <-- No signature verification, just base64
+  } catch { return null; }
+},
+
+isOwner() {
+  return this.getRoles().includes('Owner');
+},
+```
+
+**Impact:** A user can trivially craft/modify a JWT in localStorage to add the `Owner` role. While server-side validation should catch this, the client-side UI fully trusts the decoded token.
+
+**All owner pages use this pattern:**
+```javascript
+if (!AuthService.isOwner()) { router.push('/'); return; }
+```
+
+---
+
+### H2. HTTP (Unencrypted) API Endpoints Used in Production
+
+**File:** Multiple locations
+
+| File | URL |
+|------|-----|
+| `app/utils/api.js:380` | `http://45.93.137.91/api` (REPORT_API_BASE) |
+| `app/settings/page.js:351` | `http://45.93.137.91/api/Reports/SendGeneralReport` |
+| `app/privacy/page.js:114` | `http://45.93.137.91/api` |
+| `app/payments/page.js:198` | `http://45.93.137.91/api/Customer/GetMyTransaction` |
+| `app/property/[id]/page.js:71` | `http://45.93.137.91${p.image}` |
+
+**Impact:** Credentials, tokens, and personal data sent over HTTP are visible in plaintext to anyone on the network (MITM). The main API uses HTTPS (`*.nip.io`), but the Report API and several image fetches use raw HTTP.
+
+---
+
+### H3. User Credentials Logged to Console
+
+**File:** `app/login/page.js:87-92`
+
+```javascript
+console.log("[Login] Attempting login via", loginMethod, ":", formData.credential);
+```
+
+**File:** `app/utils/api.js:443-445` — Full API request bodies logged:
+
+```javascript
+console.log("API Request:", url);
+console.log("API Method:", options.method || "GET");
+console.log("API Body:", hasBody ? options.body : null);   // <-- may contain passwords
+```
+
+**Impact:** Login credentials, password change payloads, and any API body is visible in browser console. Any extension or error-logging service can capture this.
+
+---
+
+### H4. No CSP or Security Headers
+
+**File:** `next.config.mjs`
+
+```javascript
+const nextConfig = {
+  reactCompiler: true,
+  images: { remotePatterns: [ ... ] },
+};
+export default nextConfig;
+```
+
+**Missing headers:**
+- `Content-Security-Policy` — would prevent XSS (C2)
+- `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) — would enforce HTTPS
+- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
+- `X-Frame-Options: DENY` — clickjacking protection
+- `Referrer-Policy`
+
+---
+
+### H5. Mass Assignment via Spread Operator
+
+**File:** `app/owner/properties/page.js:1592`
+
+```javascript
+const updatedProperty = { ...property, ...formData };
+```
+
+**Impact:** User-controlled `formData` is spread directly into the property object. Unexpected fields (`status`, `ownerId`, `role`) could overwrite protected properties if the backend doesn't sanitize.
+
+---
+
+### H6. Error Messages Leak Internal Details to Users
+
+**12 affected files.** Pattern:
+
+```javascript
+toast.error(err.message || 'فشل تحميل البيانات');
+```
+
+**Files:** `account-verification/page.js`, `change-password/page.js`, `notifications/page.js`, `reports/page.js`, `payments/page.js`, `reservations/page.js`, `PropertyDetail.js`, `owner/*/page.js`
+
+**Impact:** Raw `err.message` may contain API paths, stack traces, or database errors. Shows internal implementation details to end users.
+
+---
+
+### H7. Firebase & VAPID Keys Hardcoded Client-Side
+
+**File:** `app/utils/firebase.js:5-11`
+
+```javascript
+const firebaseConfig = {
+  apiKey: "AIzaSyBZV7KBLRJSTApahfrO8lBesmIM3zNRSaY",
+  authDomain: "sweet-home-b2766.firebaseapp.com",
+  projectId: "sweet-home-b2766",
+  // ...
+  vapidKey: "BGZ4Fo8rRhoTdStLGlCySDZOnAX4ekCA0e3HDWXL5uEi2kOnXynYjbaDbY15002phUrFqxBpPPFHgfH2VhrmFDU",
+};
+```
+
+**Duplicated in:** `public/firebase-messaging-sw.js:8-14`, `app/components/NotificationHandler.js:70`
+
+**Impact:** While Firebase API keys are semi-public, the `projectId` and `storageBucket` exposure enables abuse if Firebase Security Rules are misconfigured. Push notifications can be sent without server authorization.
+
+---
+
+## 🟡 MEDIUM FINDINGS
+
+### M1. Hardcoded Server IP in 10+ Files
+
+The IP `45.93.137.91` is hardcoded across the codebase with no environment variable abstraction for many URLs.
+
+### M2. No CSRF Protection
+
+No CSRF tokens, no `SameSite` cookie attributes (no cookies used at all), no custom headers for state-changing operations.
+
+### M3. No Rate Limiting or Brute-Force Protection
+
+Login functions (`loginWithEmail`, `loginWithPhone`) pass credentials directly without client-side rate limiting or exponential backoff.
+
+### M4. CI/CD Server URL Exposed in Source
+
+**File:** `.gitea/workflows/deployer.yaml:14`
+```yaml
+github-server-url: http://45.93.137.91:3000
+```
+
+### M5. FCM Push Token Logged to Console
+
+**File:** `app/utils/firebase.js:45`
+```javascript
+console.log("[FCM] Token:", token);   // persistent device identifier
+```
+
+### M6. Owner Properties Cached in localStorage
+
+**File:** `app/owner/properties/page.js:1450-1453`
+```javascript
+localStorage.setItem("ownerProperties", JSON.stringify(newProperties));
+```
+
+### M7. Weak Email Validation Regex
+
+**Pattern:** `/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/` — allows ````, `|`, and special characters in local part.
+
+### M8. Report API Sends Token Over HTTP
+
+**File:** `app/settings/page.js:351` — `fetch('http://45.93.137.91/api/Reports/SendGeneralReport', ...)` with Bearer token header.
+
+### M9. No `.env` Files in Repository
+
+All environment variables fall back to hardcoded values (IPs, Firebase config). No `.env` or `.env.local` exists.
+
+### M10. User Credential Reflected in OTP UI
+
+**File:** `app/login/page.js:612` — `{formData.credential}` rendered in DOM (JSX-escaped, but could aid social engineering).
+
+### M11. Client-Side Only File Upload Validation
+
+`file.type.startsWith('image/')` — bypassable. Size limits (2MB/5MB) enforced client-side only.
+
+### M12. All Reservations Loaded Then Filtered Client-Side
+
+**File:** `app/reservations/page.js:871-899` — Fetches ALL rent properties via `getRentProperties()` for enrichment; if backend doesn't scope properly, sensitive data leaks.
+
+### M13. Reservation Report Allows Reporting Any Reservation
+
+**File:** `app/reservations/page.js:498-543` — No verification the reporter owns the reservation before filing a report.
+
+### M14. Multiple Inconsistent localStorage Keys
+
+At least 5 different keys store user data: `auth_token`, `token`, `accessToken`, `authToken`, `user`, `currentUser`, `authUser`, `profile`, `cached_user`.
+
+### M15. i18next Configured to Cache in localStorage
+
+**File:** `app/i18n/config.js:373-374` — Language detection data cached in localStorage.
+
+---
+
+## 🟢 LOW FINDINGS
+
+| # | Finding | File(s) |
+|---|---------|---------|
+| L1 | Missing `maxLength` on text inputs | `reports/page.js`, `profile/page.js`, `login/page.js` |
+| L2 | Base64 avatar images stored in localStorage | `profile/page.js:163` |
+| L3 | Weak WhatsApp number sanitization | `PropertyDetail.js:1682` — only `[^0-9]` stripped |
+| L4 | Profuse console.log throughout codebase | ~30+ files with active console.log statements |
+| L5 | Business data cached in localStorage | `owner/bookings/page.js`, `owner/profits/page.js`, `owner/calendar/page.js` |
+| L6 | No JWT library in dependencies (manual `atob` decode) | `package.json` |
+
+---
+
+## Dependencies Analysis
+
+**File:** `package.json`
+
+| Dependency | Risk |
+|------------|------|
+| `next@16.1.6` | Very bleeding-edge; verify official release |
+| `firebase@^12.11.0` | FCM only; correctly scoped |
+| `xlsx@^0.18.5` | Used for admin export; no user data flow |
+| `jspdf@^4.2.1` | Client-side PDF generation; safe |
+| `html2canvas@^1.4.1` | Screenshot capture; safe |
+| No `jsonwebtoken`/`jose` | Manual JWT decode with `atob()` — no signature verification |
+| No `helmet`/`cors`/`csurf` | No security middleware |
+| No `axios`/`ky` | Raw `fetch` used throughout |
+
+---
+
+## Attack Scenarios
+
+### Scenario 1: Full Account Takeover via XSS + OTP Logging
+1. Attacker stores a malicious property with `<script>` in the title
+2. Any user viewing the map (`PropertyMapWithMarkers.js`) executes the script
+3. Script steals JWT from `localStorage` → full account access
+4. If the victim is logging in, OTP is visible in console → complete takeover
+
+### Scenario 2: Mass Property Manipulation via IDOR
+1. Attacker enumerates property IDs via `GetRentProperties` (public)
+2. Calls `editRentProperty(id, { price: 1 })` or `updateRentPropertyStatus(id, 5)` on any property
+3. No server-side ownership check — all properties editable
+
+### Scenario 3: Credential Harvesting via MITM
+1. Attacker on same network intercepts HTTP traffic to `http://45.93.137.91/api`
+2. Captures Bearer tokens, passwords in URL query params, and personal data
+3. Credentials from `changePassword?oldPassword=...&newPassword=...` visible in plaintext
+
+---
+
+## Key Remediation Priority Matrix
+
+| Priority | Fix | Effort | Impact |
+|----------|-----|--------|--------|
+| P0 | Move JWT to httpOnly Secure SameSite cookie | High | Eliminates XSS token theft |
+| P0 | Sanitize Leaflet popup HTML with DOMPurify | Low | Fixes stored XSS |
+| P0 | Remove all console.log statements (especially OTP) | Medium | Stops data leakage |
+| P0 | Add `middleware.js` for server-side route protection | Medium | Real auth enforcement |
+| P0 | Move passwords from URL params to POST body | Low | Stops credential leakage |
+| P1 | Add CSP and security headers in `next.config.mjs` | Low | Mitigates XSS, MITM, clickjacking |
+| P1 | Add ID validation on all API calls with path IDs | Medium | Defense-in-depth vs IDOR |
+| P1 | Replace HTTP endpoints with HTTPS | Medium | Stops MITM credential theft |
+| P1 | Add server-side ownership verification on edit APIs | High (backend) | Primary IDOR fix |
+| P1 | Remove `err.message` from toast.error calls | Low | Prevents info leakage |
+| P2 | Move all hardcoded IPs/secrets to env variables | Medium | Configurable, secure defaults |
+| P2 | Enforce single localStorage key for token | Low | Consistent, auditable |
+| P2 | Add rate limiting on login APIs | High (backend) | Brute-force protection |
+| P2 | Add input maxLength and server-side validation | Low | Defense-in-depth |
+
+---
+
+## Files Reviewed
+
+| File | Lines | Key Security Findings |
+|------|-------|----------------------|
+| `app/utils/api.js` | 1088 | Token logging, passwords in URL, IDOR on edit APIs, no CSRF |
+| `app/services/AuthService.js` | 151 | localStorage JWT, no signature verification, role from decoded JWT |
+| `app/login/page.js` | 800+ | OTP in console, credential logging, credential in UI |
+| `app/property/[id]/PropertyDetail.js` | 1700+ | Error messages leak, WhatsApp link construction |
+| `app/components/PropertyMapWithMarkers.js` | 100+ | **Stored XSS** via Leaflet popup HTML |
+| `app/components/home/PropertyMap.js` | 250+ | HTML injection in DivIcon |
+| `app/owner/properties/page.js` | 1650+ | Mass assignment, localStorage caching, console.log |
+| `app/owner/reservations/page.js` | 1350+ | IDOR on confirm/reject, localStorage fallback keys |
+| `app/reservations/page.js` | 1000+ | Load all rent properties, report any reservation, error leakage |
+| `app/settings/page.js` | 500+ | Token over HTTP, multiple localStorage fallback keys |
+| `app/profile/page.js` | 250+ | localStorage caching, base64 avatar, console.log |
+| `next.config.mjs` | 12 | No security headers, no CSP |
+| `package.json` | — | No security libraries |
+| `app/utils/firebase.js` | 60 | Hardcoded Firebase config, FCM token logging |
+| `.gitea/workflows/deployer.yaml` | 30 | CI/CD internal URL exposed |
+| `app/payments/page.js` | 300+ | Token from multiple localStorage keys |
+| `app/owner/properties/add/page.js` | 700+ | Full payload logged to console |
+| `app/register/*/page.js` | 2000+ | Client-only file upload validation |
+| `app/change-password/page.js` | 60+ | Error leakage |
+| `app/account-verification/page.js` | 110+ | Error leakage |
+
+---
+
+*Report generated June 16, 2026. All findings based on static analysis of client-side source code.*